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 Executive Summary 
USJFCOM Joint Battlespace Awareness ISR Integration Capability (JBAIIC) Test 
Support at Joint Expeditionary Force Exercise 2010-3 
 
Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment 2010-3 (JEFX 10-3) execution took place on the Nevada 
Test and Training Range (NTTR) and other portions of Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada 
and at the U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground (DPG), Utah from 12 to 22 April 2010. JEFX is a 
Chief-of-Staff of the Air Force-directed series of experiments combining live, virtual and 
constructive air, space, naval, and ground forces, and process and technology innovation, into a 
near-seamless joint warfighting environment. These highly-focused, multi-Service experiments 
are designed to rigorously assess and make recommendations on selected capabilities that enable 
decision superiority and fill identified capability gaps needed today to produce desired effects in 
the joint battlespace.  
The JFCOM JBAIIC ISR Test Bed deployed to/participated in JEFX10-3 at the Dugway Proving 
Grounds (DPG) from 05 to 22 April 2010. The JBAIIC Test Bed was asked to participate to 
provide a ground force infrastructure (simulated Battalion Tactical Operations Center and 
tactical vehicle surrogates) and tactical personnel in support of the Joint Fighting Information to 
the Tactical Edge (JFITE) initiative, sponsored by the USAF Global Cyberspace Integration 
Center (GCIC) (see Figure 1). The JBAIIC team comprised technical, tactical, and academic 
support from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), MITRE, Harris Corporation, Sierra Nevada 
Corporation (SNC), and the U.S. Naval Aviation Reserve Digital Kill Chain Unit - Detachment 
Bravo.   
 
The JFITE initiative was designed to satisfy a USCENTCOM Joint Urgent Operational Need 
(JUON) to provide high-bandwidth, high-throughput communications between geographically 
remote regions within the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) Area of 
Responsibility and extend them to forces on the ground. The JFITE initiative had limited success 
using the developmental Communications Airborne Layer Expansion (CABLE) “air bridge” 
network during the second week of the experiment due to sporadic connectivity between 
Dugway and Nellis (eventually attributed to a flooded data link antenna on an Orion relay 
aircraft).  However, a classified terrestrial enclave established on the Joint Mission Environment 
Test Capability (JMETC) network to support the testing of the other JEFX10-3/JFITE air/ground 
integration initiatives, functioned admirably in the backup role. In addition to prospective JFITE 
ground-segment communications, JBAIIC successfully integrated the MITRE Collaborative 
Targeting suite and the IP Communicator Voice over IP (VoIP) system. The DARPA 
Heterogeneous Aircraft Reconnaissance Team (HART) initiative was only partially integrated 
due to technical issues with the HART system. Nevertheless, a HART client in the JBAIIC 






















































Figure 1. JEFX 10-3 / JFITE / JBAIIC Operational Overview 
This overview shows the ISR assets, C2 nodes, and network connectivity for JEFX 10-3 with 
germane Nellis AFB assets on the left, and Dugway Proving Ground assets on the right. The 
JBAIIC TOC, Joint Reconfigurable Vehicle (JRV), and dismounts were located on DPG.    
The JBAIIC ISR test bed team experimented with commercial mesh network systems to provide 
JBAIIC's Interactive Common Intelligence/Common Tactical Picture (I-CIP/CTP) to dismounts 
to extend enhanced battlespace awareness to the tactical edge, extend the reach of C2, increase 
lethality, and mitigate fratricide and civilian casualties. Using SNC Tactinettm T5 tablet- and 
T1.5 handheld-computers, both a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) and simulated Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) personnel were able to receive and display the I-CIP/CTP, as well as 
perform chat and VoIP communications. The short-range SNC devices were successfully 
integrated with a Harris PRC-117G Falcon III tm radio mounted in the JBAIIC Joint 
Reconfigurable Vehicle (JRV). The PRC-117G provided an 11-mile LOS backbone link to the 
JBAIIC TOC for network access to other JEFX10-3 participants and C2/ISR data at Dugway, as 
well as the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), F-15E/Strike Eagle and MQ-9/Reaper 
simulations, and processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) nodes at Nellis AFB. 
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 Additionally, the SNC Tactinettm T5 was integrated with the Battlefield Air Operations (BAO) 
Kit software to support network-enabled Close Air Support (CAS) missions, and successfully 
produce/transmit a Cursor-on-Target (CoT) 9-line message to the strike simulators, although 
further work is required for reliable machine-to-machine operations.   
JEFX 10-3 was also used as a spiral risk reduction event in support of a scheduled U.S. Navy 
SEAL evaluation of JBAIIC's I-CIP/CTP in a combat theater. A similar PRC-117G/Tactinettm 
mesh net architecture was deployed to a combat theater in the spring of 2010, and should soon 
enable the extension of the JBAIIC I-CIP/CTP to SEAL tactical units operating on classified 
networks at the tactical edge. 
 
Key Findings/Observations: 
1. Observers from the Joint Staff J-3 ISR Division, USCENTCOM Science Advisor's Office 
and J-6, USJFCOM J-8, USAF Electronic Systems Command (ESC), and USAF GCIC 
were impressed with the overall success at moving C2 and ISR data to / from the tactical 
edge via the SNC Tactinettm/Harris PRC-117G mesh net. 
2. The CIP/CTP, VoIP, and JFITE chat provided the TOC and JTACs with SA sufficient for 
the conduct of strike operations. In particular, the display of friendly force locations (JRV 
and SOF) and enemy targets (SA-6 and sniper) on the FalconView-based display 
facilitated the JTAC’s development of the CAS nine-line message. The utility of the 
CIP/CTP to the JTAC would have increased if strike aircraft positions were available. 
3. Communications between the Dugway JTAC (Baja 06), the Reaper UAS (Drone 1), and 
the F-15 (Beagle 01) simulators at Nellis were normally conducted via VoIP, and were 
consistently received / acknowledged. Digital nine-lines were also successfully sent to the 
Reaper as CoT messages from the BAO Kit Bareback application, but were not 
successfully sent to the Link-16-enabled F-15.  Note: The CoT nine-lines were displayed 
to the Reaper pilot in a non-standard format which compelled him to search for the 
required data and sometimes resulted in an incorrect read-back to the JTAC.   
4. Multiple attempts were made to stream compressed/reduced frame rate motion imagery 
through the PRC-117G/Tacticomptm T5 tactical network.  Imagery streamed with 
sufficient resolution for good tactical situational awareness, but apparently due to 
insufficient overall throughput, data packets began dropping, and video clarity rapidly 
degraded to unusable in about 2 minutes. Currently, only ISR still imagery is feasible.    
5. The CABLE air bridge did not provide reliable connectivity between Dugway Proving 
Ground and Nellis AFB, making execution of the JFITE operational thread impossible. 




From 12 to 22 April, 2010, Joint Forces Command’s Joint Battlespace Awareness ISR 
Integration Capability (JBAIIC) participated in JEFX 10-3, primarily to support the Joint 
Fighting Information to the Tactical Edge (JFITE) thread. The JBAIIC trailers (Joint Mission 
Support Modules (JMSM) 1, 2, and 3), functioning as a surrogate Battalion Tactical Operations 
Center (TOC), were located adjacent to the Kuddes Operations Center in the Ditto Test Area of 
Dugway Proving Ground (DPG). During operations, the Joint Reconfigurable Vehicle (JRV), 
functioning as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) vehicle, and a simulated Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) vehicle were located in the vicinity of Mustang Village (Wig 
Mountain) about 11 miles northwest of DPG’s Ditto Test Area (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Map of the Ditto - Wig Mountain Area of DPG 
The blue arrow indicates the Ditto Test Area where the JBAIIC Tactical Operations Center 
(TOC) was located. The vehicle icon near Wig Mountain indicates the approximate location of 
the JRV and the SOF vehicle for execution of the JFITE thread. The distance between the TOC 
and the JRV (green arrows) was approximately 11 statute miles. In moving between the TOC and 
Wig Mountain, the vehicles moved approximately due west of the Ditto Test Area until they 
reached the water tower (vicinity of Baker Laboratory) and then moved due north to the base of 
Wig Mountain where Mustang Village is located. 
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 2. Joint Fighting Information to the Tactical Edge (JFITE) Thread 
 
JBAIIC’s involvement in JEFX 10-3 was centered on supporting the execution of the JFITE 
thread. A version of the JFITE thread timeline (distributed 2 April) is included as Appendix 2. 
Participants in the scenario are listed in Table 1. Following is a synopsis of the JFITE thread 
scenario focusing on the participation of the JBAIIC nodes.   
Table 1. Participants in the Execution of the JFITE Thread 
 
The JFITE thread called for the JBAIIC JTAC (call sign “Baja 06”) and SOF (“Cheetah”) to 
drive west of Ditto. The Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) (“Digger”) disseminated a 
Cursor-on-Target (CoT) message for a Signal Intelligence (SIGINT)-generated contact on a 
simulated SA-6/GAINFUL-associated radar located in the vicinity of Mustang Village. The 
JBAIIC TOC (“Tarzan 01”) diverted Baja 06 and Cheetah to Mustang Village to investigate the 
contact. While en route, Baja 06 submitted a request for Intelligence Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) support (overhead imagery of the AOI). Tarzan 01 approved the request 
and forwarded it to Digger. Tarzan 01 also requested local ISR data from the Heterogeneous 
Airborne Reconnaissance Team (HART) operator. The HART operator created a service request 
for local surveillance video of the AOI via the HART client in the TOC. Digger distributed an 
image of the target area obtained with national assets via a CoT message. The next step in the 
thread called for real-time dissemination of video of the target location from a HART Unmanned 
Aircraft System (UAS). This was not accomplished. Rather, the JBAIIC NOC disseminated a 
sample of pre-provided HART video.  
Participant Call Sign Location Comment 
JBAIIC TOC Tarzan 01 Ditto Area  
JTAC  Baja 06 Wig 
Mountain 
Mounted on the JRV 
SOF Cheetah  Wig 
Mountain 
The dismounted SOF was located in a saddle 
on Wig Mountain overlooking Mustang 
Village approximately 0.3 mile from the JRV 
HART 
operator 
NA TOC  
F-15 Beagle 01 Eglin AFB Simulator 
Reaper Drone 1 Nellis AFB Simulator  
ASOC Digger Nellis AFB  
JTAC Baja 04 Nellis AFB  
PED NA Nellis AFB  
TCS/GCS NA Nellis AFB  
The JTAC and SOF vehicles arrived at the base of Wig Mountain. Cheetah dismounted and 
climbed to a saddle on the ridge to overlook Mustang Village with Line-of-Sight (LOS) to the 
JTAC vehicle. Cheetah observed the surrogate SA-6/GAINFUL target and passed, via JFITE 
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 chat, coordinates determined using a preloaded image and a National Imagery Transmission 
Format (NITF) Image Viewer.  Baja 06 distributed the SA-6 target location via a BAO Kit CoT 
(Bareback) target message. The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) Time Sensitive 
Target (TST) cell assigned the target to the Reaper UAS (“Drone 1”). Cheetah observed the SA-
6 move into a warehouse and sent an updated target location to Baja 06. Baja 06 disseminated a 
Battlefield Air Operations (BAO) Kit Bareback CoT nine-line for the target.   
Baja 06 took fire from a sniper and requested immediate Close Air Support (CAS). The CAOC 
TST cell assigned this CAS mission to the F-15/STRIKE EAGLE (“Beagle 01”). The Nellis 
JTAC (“Baja 04”) tasked Beagle 01 to proceed to Dugway to support Baja 06. The HART 
operator simulated locating the sniper on real-time Full Motion Video (FMV) and verbally 
passed the coordinates to Tarzan 01 who generated a CoT target message, including a preloaded 
image, with CoT debug. Digger delayed the Reaper strike on the SA-6 to allow for the F-15 
strike on the sniper. Baja 06 read the nine-line to Beagle 01 via Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP) and cleared Beagle 01 to engage. Cheetah reported weapon detonation (simulated) on the 
sniper’s position.  
After Beagle 01 departed the area, Drone 1 was instructed to resume the strike against the 
simulated SA-6. Drone 1 was cleared to engage via VoIP by Baja 06. Cheetah reported weapon 
detonation (simulated) on the warehouse. The HART operator provided a Battle Damage 
Assessment (BDA) image of the target area to Tarzan 01 who disseminated it to other thread 
participants. 
The JFITE thread was tightly scripted. The main purpose of the thread was to demonstrate 
connectivity and collaboration between thread participants. Thus, the focus was not on tactical 
realism.  Delineated below are some notable ways in which thread execution either deviated 
from the script and/or was tactically unrealistic: 
• The time allocated for execution of the thread was limited (about 45 minutes). Baja 06 
and Cheetah could not execute the required movements, in the vehicles and on foot, 
quickly enough. Accordingly, they were prepositioned at the base of Wig Mountain and 
on the ridge, respectively and did not move during the course of thread execution. 
   
• The time constraints for the JTAC to generate targets and nine-lines often resulted in the 
JTAC preparing the messages in advance. Similarly, time constraints compelled the SOF 
to provide predefined target locations rather than mensurating them from images in real-
time.  Figure 3, below, shows a JTAC in the JRV. 
 
• Real-time imagery, both still and video, and the geo-refinement of that imagery, as 
indicated in the thread description above, were not realistically addressed in the execution 




 • The F-15 simulation produced a track in the CIP/CTP but the simulated aircraft, located 
in the Nellis area for the early part of the thread, did not have time to fly to the Dugway 
area by the end of the thread so the F-15 icon never appeared in the DPG area of 
operations. 
 
• The script often called for the employment of Collaborative Targeting (CT). JBAIIC 
nodes never used collaborative targeting. The TOC S3 stated CT seemed “redundant with 
Transverse (chat) ... more difficult to use and less reliable”. 
 
• Both the F-15 and the Reaper UAS had difficulty in displaying the nine-lines in a 
standard format. Consequently, read-backs were sometimes erroneous. This was ignored 
to expedite execution of the thread. 
By the second week of JEFX, the JFITE thread was being smoothly executed by the participants 
when using the Joint Mission Environment Test Capability (JMETC) network “terrestrial” link 
between Nellis AFB and Dugway Proving Ground.  
 
Figure 3. A JTAC in the JRV 
2.1 JFITE Thread Execution Schedule 
 
The test plan called for the execution of the JFITE thread twice a day. The first iteration was 
nominally initiated at 1300 Mountain Daylight Time. After the completion of the first iteration, 
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 there was about a 40 minute interval before the thread was executed again. During the first week 
of JEFX 10-3 (April 14-16), all iterations were conducted using the JMETC link between 
Dugway and Nellis. During the second week, the first iteration was executed using the JMETC. 
After completion of this iteration, the thread was attempted with only the Communications 
Airborne Layer Expansion (CABLE) “air bridge” enabled.  
3. Systems and Applications Used in the Execution of the JFITE Thread 
 
In the sections below, the use of systems and applications is considered primarily from the 
perspective of the JBAIIC nodes. Much of the information appearing below, in particular the 
findings, is based on questionnaires submitted to participants at the conclusion of each day’s 
JFITE threads. These participants included the TOC S3, the HART operator, the JTAC, and the 
SOF. The questionnaire is included as Appendix 3. This information was supplemented with 
observer logs from the TOC, JRV, and SOF locations. 
 
3.1 Common Intelligence Picture/Common Tactical Picture (CIP/CTP) 
3.1.1 Dugway 
The JBAIIC Network Operations Center (NOC)-generated CIP/CTP included the following DPG 
elements injected by the NOC: 
• TOC Positive Position Locating Information (PPLI) 
 
• JRV and SOF PPLI (produced by Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) Tacticomptm T5 and 
T1.5 militarized tablet computers). 
 
• Target icons (generated by the JBAIIC JTAC via the BAO Kit Bareback application. 
When the JTAC used Bareback to generate a nine-line, additional icons related to the 
strike mission were displayed) 
 
• Target icons with images (generated by the TOC S3) 
3.1.2 Nellis AFB Data 
A CoT data stream from Nellis AFB was integrated into the DPG NOC CIP/CTP.  Most of the 
Nellis data were irrelevant to Dugway operations as they depicted tracks in the Nellis area.  The 
data from the Nellis data stream that were relevant to Dugway were: 
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 • The initial JFITE thread target location provided by the Nellis Air Support Operations 
Center (ASOC). 
 
• SA-6 target location with embedded image provided by the Nellis ASOC. 
 
• PPLI for the Dugway Tactical Data Network (TDN) trailer (not relevant to operations). 
The tracks of the simulated F-15 and MQ-9 aircraft would have been useful but they never 
reached the Dugway area of operations. 
There were CIP/CTP data that originated on the unclassified network at Dugway, were sent to 
Nellis through a one way diode to the JMETC (classified) network, and passed back to Dugway 
in the Nellis CoT data stream and displayed in the CIP/CTP. These included: 
• HART UAS PPLI. These were displayed only on the last day of JEFX 10-3 (22 April). 
 
• Target icons generated by the HART client in the JBAIIC TOC. 
3.1.3 Nellis AFB Common Operational Picture (COP) 
The NOC Dugway CIP/CTP was transmitted to Nellis AFB and incorporated into the Nellis 
COP. 
3.1.4 CIP/CTP Findings 
• The display of friendly asset locations (JRV and SOF) and the targets (SA-6 and sniper) 
in FalconView (FV) facilitated the JTAC’s development of nine-line messages. 
 
• Display of friendly asset locations on the  CIP/CTP at  the Nellis CAOC facilitated the 
execution of the JFITE thread 
 
• HART did not provide Sensor Point of Interest (SPOI) data for its UAS assets. 
 
• Simulated strike aircraft PPLI did not appear in the Dugway area of operations. Those 
tracks would have been helpful to both the JTAC and SOF. 
• The F-15 simulator did not have FalconView. The simulator pilot could not see the FV 
icons and obtain the information associated with the nine-lines sent by the JTAC. The 
nine-line information was not consistently transferred to Link-16; therefore the JTAC 






There were three distinct chat programs used in the execution of the JFITE thread. All were 
Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) based. The primary chat program used 
was Openfire/Transverse chat hosted on a server at Nellis AFB.  After the first few days of 
JEFX10-3, JBAIIC participants only logged into and used the Nellis JFITE chat room. This was 
the primary chat room used for JFITE thread execution. Openfire/Transverse chat was also 
hosted on a server in the JBAIIC Dugway NOC.  The CoT chat room hosted on the NOC server 
was used for technical issues related to the JBAIIC nodes and was used for JBAIIC node 
communications when the link to Nellis was down and the Nellis chat rooms were unavailable.  
The third chat program was target specific chat within Collaborative Targeting (CT). This was 
not used by the JBAIIC nodes. 
3.2.1 Chat Findings 
• Chat was the most reliable of all the available means of collaborative communications. 
 
• In JEFX 10-3, the primary collaboration means was IPC VoIP with JFITE chat as the 
backup.  In circumstances where only one or two nodes were unable to use VoIP the 
other participants continued to use VoIP and the disadvantaged participants lacked 
information on the execution of the mission. In such circumstances, if chat is to be a 
useful backup to VoIP, an operator must be tasked to continually update the status of the 
operation in chat. 
 
• The JTACs viewed chat as an unacceptable alternative to voice communications with 
strike aircraft (for the first JFITE thread on 16 April, VoIP was unavailable and 
operations were conducted exclusively over chat). 
 
• On the occasions when the Nellis link was lost, the operator had to reconnect to the Nellis 
chat server; the chat connection was not automatically restored when the link was 
restored. 
 
• It was not obvious if the user was no longer connected to chat. A conspicuous alert is 
needed to indicate the state of chat connectivity. 
• VoIP was the primary collaborative means for the JFITE thread except for transmission 
of coordinates. For example, when the SOF passed coordinates to the JTAC, chat was the 
preferred means. It would have been preferable if the coordinates were disseminated via 
track generation. 
 




• On a few occasions, thread actions that were intended to be conducted via chat were 
required to be confirmed over VoIP because the thread manager was not monitoring chat. 
 
3.3 Internet Protocol Communicator (IPC) VoIP 
 
All JBAIIC nodes (JRV/JTAC, SOF, and TOC) participated in IPC VoIP.  The use of IPC was 
introduced late in the JBAIIC planning process for JFEX 10-3 so there was no opportunity to 
provide Quality of Service (QoS) for IPC communications. Nevertheless, although there were 
some problems with reliability, it generally worked well. This was probably due to the fact that 
the FMV video streams that were expected to flow between Dugway and Nellis were seldom 
present. When IPC was not up, the fallback was for a node to function on JFITE chat.   
Although IPC can be used point-to-point, when executing the JFITE thread, virtually all IPC 
communications were via conference call.  Despite this, there was almost no overlap of 
communications. This can be attributed, in part, to the tightly scripted nature of the JFITE thread. 
3.3.1 VoIP findings 
• When VoIP was up, it generally worked well and voice quality was good. 
 
• If VoIP has to compete with FMV for bandwidth, QoS will have to be implemented. 
 
• The Cisco Call Manager was located at Nellis AFB. When the link to Nellis was lost 
VoIP was lost at Dugway. A local Call Manager was needed. 
 
• When the VoIP connection to Nellis was lost, as happened frequently when the CABLE 
air bridge was in use, users had to repeatedly dial in to reestablish connections. An 
automated method to reestablish the connection is required. 
 
• In real-world operations the VoIP communications between JTAC and aircraft will have 
to be point-to-point rather than by conference rooms to eliminate the possibility of 
interference by other users during the critical phases of mission execution. 
 
• It would have been helpful for the JTAC team participants to have an IPC speaker in the 
JRV. 
 
• In some instances JBAIIC nodes could not access IPC because the maximum number of 




• Often there was no timely indication to users that VoIP was down. 
 
3.4 Heterogeneous Airborne Reconnaissance Team (HART) 
 
The source of the real-time imagery to support the JFITE thread in JEFX 10-3 was HART.  
HART is a web-based control system that autonomously manages a network of (up to 50) 
manned and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft.  HART provides a web-based means for the 
submission of ISR requests and the dissemination of the results to the requestor. HART 
automatically geo-registers the coordinates of each imagery pixel to an accuracy of better than 10 
meters and performs this operation for each frame in less than 2 seconds.  The imagery is 
automatically evaluated for obscuration, resolution, etc. to ensure that only useable imagery is 
delivered to the customer. The automated geo-registration and assessment of imagery quality is 
performed by Portable Air-vehicle Image Exploitation Supercomputers (PAIES) located at the 
ISR asset ground stations. The HART products are sent to the HART Command and Control 
Center (HC3). HART does not directly control the ISR platforms, but does directly command 
platform sensors. 
When a user on a HART client submits an ISR request, HART searches its video repositories to 
determine if there is available video that will satisfy the request. If so, it provides the requestor 
with the video. During JEFX10-3 this archived video feature was not available to the HART 
operator. 
3.4.1 HART at Dugway 
From 5 to 22 April HART conducted a demonstration at DPG.  The ISR assets managed by 
HART during this demonstration included: six Raven UAS, two ScanEagles UAS, two Shadow 
UAS, one Bat UAS, one Hunter UAS, one Twin Otter turboprop aircraft, and one Sabreliner jet 
aircraft. The network infrastructure was provided by Tactical Targeting Network Technology 
(TTNT)/ QUINT Networking Technology (QNT). During this demonstration HART ran in an 
unclassified mode. 
A HART client was installed in the JBAIIC TOC.  Its purpose was to enable the JBAIIC TOC to 
request ISR support as required by the JFITE thread. The format of the HART FMV is H.264 
with metadata sent with the extended Key Length Value (KLV) format which permits the 
transmission of the imagery geo-registration information. 
There were three ways in which HART was to be integrated into JFITE operations: 
• Live HART video was to be disseminated to all operational nodes. This was not 
accomplished because the HART software needed to convert the format of the HART 
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 video from H.264 with augmented KLV metadata in a Flash wrapper to Standardization 
Agreement (STANAG) 4609 compliant format was not provided by HART. A recorded 
sample of HART video in the required format was provided to the JBAIIC NOC. This 
unclassified imagery was transmitted from the NOC to Nellis AFB, pushed through a one 
way diode, returned to Dugway on the classified JMETC network and multicast by a 
Primary Image Capture Transformation Element (PICTE) from the NOC to JBAIIC 
participants. This video was viewed for demonstration purposes and was not used in 
execution of the JFITE thread. 
 
• In response to an ISR tasking, the JBAIIC TOC HART operator (see Figure 4) was to 
capture an image from the HART FMV displayed on his workstation. He was to annotate 
a target location using HART geo-refined imagery to provide an accurate target location 
and, using the CoT debug application, send this target with embedded image via a one 
way diode to the JMETC network for dissemination to all participants. This was not 
accomplished because the CoT debug message with embedded image from HART was 
sent via Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the Nellis diode only accepted User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP). The CoT message with image could not be sent UDP because 
the image size greatly exceeded the 64kB UDP limit. In addition, the HART annotation 
function was not enabled for JEFX. A HART target message without an image was able 
to be sent UDP and passed through the diode and was displayed on the classified 
CIP/CTP. 
 
• The PPLI and SPOI of all HART UAS assets were to be displayed on the classified 
CIP/CTP. The original plan was to use the HART KLV data and create, in the NOC, 
PPLI and SPOI CoT messages for all the HART assets. However, since HART produced 
a CoT track stream it was elected to use these data to populate the classified CIP/CTP.  
On the last day of JEFX 10-3 (22 April) the PPLI of HART assets were successfully 




Figure 4. HART Operator in the TOC 
The HART client is the notebook computer. It is being used to access FMV from one of the HART 
UAS assets. The HART client picture is being displayed on the large monitor. 
3.4.2 HART Findings 
• The HART client in the TOC was not integrated into the collaborative execution of the 
JFITE thread. No CT, IPC, or Transverse chat. 
 
• The HART applications for searching the video repository and annotating images were 
not enabled for JEFX 10-3. 
 
• The HART application for converting the HART video to a STANAG 4906-compliant 





 • Unclassified CoT debug messages with embedded images produced by the TOC HART 
client could not be passed through the diode to the classified network. 
 
• The HART CoT stream for UAS assets did not include SPOI. 
 
•  By the second week of JEFX 10-3, HART ISR requests originating with the JBAIIC 
TOC HART client were almost always satisfied. 
 
• The operator of the HART client in the TOC had real-time access to all of the video 
streams (one at a time) generated by HART UAS assets. Typically, there were three or 
four to choose from. Much of the time the imagery was of mediocre quality. On the last 
day of the experiment, with two Ravens airborne, the imagery was of high quality. 
 
• The HART operator had to use the CoT debug application to send images. He stated it 
would be better to have a resident HART application to send a CoT message with an 
embedded image and also have a HART CoT message that contains an embedded link to 
a HART video file. 
 
3.5 Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) Devices 
 
SNC provided Versatile Access Points (VAP) wireless routers, and Tacticomptm T1.5 and T5 
hand-held militarized tablet computers (see Figure 5) in support of JEFX 10-3 distributed as 
indicated in Figure 7.  The T1.5s and T5s associated with a given VAP form a mesh network.  
Only the T5 associated with the SOF participated in the execution of the JFITE thread.  All SNC 
devices in the mesh network associated with the JRV VAP provided PPLI for the SOF and JRV 
that were displayed in the CIP/CTP. 
Initially, the SNC T5s and T1.5s had proprietary versions of chat and VoIP that were not 
compatible with the IPC and XMPP chat used in JEFX 10-3. The T5 was loaded with IPC, 
XMPP chat, and CT and was able to participate in collaborative chat and VoIP communications 
with other JFITE thread nodes. The T1.5s could not load these applications and their role in the 
JFITE thread was limited to providing PPLI.  
Subsequent to thread execution, a Tacticomptm T5 with an attached Tactisighttm helmet-mounted 
display (HMD) wirelessly passed video to the VAP in the JRV and then via a Harris PRC-117G 
Falcon IIItm IP-capable wideband radio to the T5 in the TOC. The frame rate was set at five 





Figure 5. The SOF Team on Wig Mountain 
This location in a saddle on Wig Mountain was selected to provide line of sight to the JRV, 
located several hundred feet to the north and provide the SOF with an overview of Mustang 
Village to the south. The seated operator is holding a TacticomptmT5. 
3.5.1 SNC Findings 
• The SNC Tacticomptm T5 devices were fully integrated into the JBAIIC classified tactical 
network permitting the SOF to effectively participate in the execution of the JFITE 
thread. 
 
• There were many tools and applications the SOF needed, or were expected to use, 
competing for space on the T5’s relatively small display. These included:  two Transverse 
chats, FV, NITF Image Viewer, IPC, CT, and an on-screen keyboard. 
 




 • Live helmet cam video (transmitted using SNC STS software from T-5 to PRC-117G to 
TOC) was initially clear while dismounted, and while moving inside a vehicle. However, 
the video began to pixilate until unusable after approximately two minutes transmission.  
Limitations were likely due to bandwidth limitations of the longer-range PRC-117G 
architecture segment, further discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3. 
 
3.6 Collaborative Targeting (CT) 
 
CT software is an extension of the FalconView (FV) CoT plug-in. In the main CT window, the 
Mission Tracks Workspace, tracks nominated to CT are displayed. CT features a target specific 
embedded chat capability. CT is integrated with Precision Strike Suite - Special Operations 
Forces (PSS-SOF) and CT tracks can be sent to PSS-SOF for geo-refinement. In JEFX 10-3, 
PSS-SOF did not have the necessary reference data base (Digital Point Positioning Database - 
DPPDB) so this geo-refinement feature of CT could not be employed.  In the early phases of 
JEFX 10-3 there were problems with CT connectivity.  In the later phases, CT seemed to work 
more reliably but the JBAIIC nodes were successfully executing the JFITE thread using IPC and 
JFITE chat. CT was yet another application with no obvious advantage, for target prosecution. 
CT was not employed by the JBAIIC nodes. The only exception to this was when the TOC S3 
occasionally looked in the CT Mission Tracks Workspace to see if targets appeared there. 
3.6.1 CT Findings 
The perception by JBAIIC participants was that CT was another application that presented no 
obvious advantages in the prosecution of the strike missions and, accordingly, it was not 
employed by the JBAIIC nodes.  A  SOF participant commented CT was “one tool too many”. 
The SOF operator had:  two Transverse chats, FV, a NITF image viewer, IPC, and an on- screen 
keyboard, all competing for space on a small display. 
 
3.7 Air Bridge 
 
On three occasions during the second week of JEFX10-3, participants attempted to execute the 
JFITE thread using the CABLE air bridge as the link between Dugway Proving Ground and 
Nellis AFB. During the three attempts to use the air bridge (19, 20, and 22 April) the 
connectivity between Nellis and Dugway was sporadic, as demonstrated by repeated attempts to 
communicate between the two locations using IPC and JFITE chat.  It was not possible to 
execute the JFITE thread using the CABLE air bridge. 
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 3.7.1 Air Bridge Findings 
• The CABLE air bridge did not provide a reliable communication link between Nellis 
AFB and Dugway Proving Ground. 
 
3.8 Collaborative Communications 
 
As discussed above, collaborative communications used by the JBAIIC nodes during the 
execution of the JFITE thread, in order of priority, were: 
• VoIP 
 
• Nellis Transverse Chat (JFITE chat room) 
 
• Dugway Transverse chat (CoT chat room) 
CT was not used.  
Other lesser used communications were:  
• PRC-117G (between TOC and JRV) 
 
• Cell phone (primarily between SOF and JRV, but also between the TOC and JRV, and 
TOC and SOF). A JTAC stated there should have been a hand-held radio for 
communications between the JTAC and SOF. 
 
3.9 Geo-refinement Applications 
 
Both CT and BAO Kit contain the PSS-SOF geo-refinement application. However, the DPPDB 
reference data required by PSS-SOF was not available and therefore the application was not 
used. HART imagery has each pixel geo-refined to an accuracy of less than 10 meters. The geo-
refined coordinates of any target in HART imagery could be obtained from the HART client in 
the TOC. HART did not provide coordinates for the simulated SA-6 and the sniper was not 
visible in the available imagery. Accordingly, target geo-refinement from real-time imagery 
using credible tools was not executed during the course of the JFITE thread. In the case of the 
simulated SA-6 in the open and later in the warehouse, the geo-refined target location was 
obtained by the SOF operator using a preloaded image of Mustang Village, the SOF’s view of 
the target area, and NITF Image Viewer. The NITF image viewer provides the coordinates of 
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 any point on the NITF image where the operator places the cursor. Figure 6 is a screen shot of 
NITF Image Viewer. Unfortunately the Viewer does not allow the operator to copy the 
coordinates, and they had to be manually typed into a chat message. Because of the time 
constraints of the JFITE thread, the SOF operator did not normally produce the coordinates in 
real-time from the NITF image but rather simply passed pre-specified coordinates. 
 
Figure 6. NITF Image Viewer Screenshot 
A portion of a preloaded NITF image that was viewed in NITF Image Viewer. The cursor marks 
the building in Mustang Village that sheltered the simulated SA-6. The three-dimensional 
coordinates of the cursor location are displayed on the upper dialogue bar. 
During the last week of JEFX 10-3, the sniper’s geo-refined location was notionally generated by 
the HART operator in the TOC and verbally passed to the TOC S3, who inserted it into the 
JFITE collaborative network via a CoT message. 
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 4. JBAIIC Network Architecture 
 
Figure 7. JBAIIC Network Architecture for JEFX 10-3 
Figure 7 shows the JBAIIC network architecture for JEFX 10-3. Shortly before execution of 
JEFX10-3, a National Security Agency (NSA) waiver permitting the use of the SNC devices in a 
classified network was received. This resulted in significant changes to the JBAIIC network 
architecture. In particular, the JRV was run entirely on the classified network rather than on both 
classified and unclassified networks as originally planned. As depicted in Figure 7, in the TOC 
there were two PRC-117G radios. One of these was required to provide an air gap between the 
TOC T5 and the other PRC-117G in the TOC as mandated by the NSA waiver for the SNC 
devices. During execution of the JFITE thread, the TOC T5 and the PRC-117G external (but 
linked) to, the JRV and its associated SNC devices were not used. JBAIIC JFITE thread 
operations were conducted with only two PRC-117G radios (one in the TOC and one in the 
JRV), and the SOF T5. In the TOC and NOC it was necessary to support both classified and 
unclassified networks in order to integrate the unclassified HART system into the JBAIIC 
tactical networks. 




 The discone antenna for the PRC-117G was mounted on a tower at the Ditto Test Area site 
immediately adjacent to the JBAIIC TOC. The antenna was originally located at a height of 35 
feet Above Ground Level (AGL). During JRV transits to and from Mustang Village, it was 
observed that the link between the TOC and JRV was virtually nonexistent on the northern leg 
(see Figure 2) of the transit to Wig Mountain. The communications link was restored when the 
elevation of the JRV increased in the vicinity of Wig Mountain. To eliminate this dead zone, the 
antenna was moved to a height of 60 feet AGL on 16 April. This had no discernable effect on 
TOC to JRV communications. On 19 April an LM-400 low loss cable specifically intended for 
long distance radio frequency communications was installed between the radio in the TOC and 
the tower-mounted antenna. The resulting increase in signal strength permitted a continuous link 
between the TOC and JRV during the transit to Wig Mountain. After the cable upgrade, range 
testing was done between the TOC and the JRV:  Over flat terrain the maximum range was 
approximately 13.8 statute miles. The maximum range for the SOF T5 to JRV link was about 1.3 
statute miles. 
 
4.2 Throughput  
 
Limited testing was performed on the network throughput between the TOC and JRV and SOF. 
The data are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Throughput between the TOC and JRV and SOF 
From – To JRV/SOF location Throughput (kbps) 
NOC – JRV  Ditto Test Area 231.2 
NOC – SOF (T5) Ditto Test Area 229.6 
JRV-TOC Wig Mountain 118.4 
T5- TOC Wig Mountain 193.6 
 
Although only two PRC-117G radios were used in the JFITE thread execution, the JBAIIC PRC-
117G network architecture contained four radios (see Figure 7) requiring throughputs to be 
configured for a five radio PRC-117G net - at best, a throughput of 500 kilobits per second 
(kbps). As shown in Table 2, the demonstrated throughputs, even with the transmitting and 
receiving stations adjacent, was only 230 kbps. With the JRV and SOF at their operational 
locations about 11 miles from the TOC, near maximum range of the PRC-117G, the throughput 
rates fell below 200 kbps.   




 Sample HART video was transmitted from the JBAIIC NOC to Nellis AFB, through the one way 
diode into the classified network, and then back to the NOC where it was disseminated to the 
JBAIIC nodes. It was broadcast at 100-150 kbps and frame rates of 2 or 5 frames per second 
(FPS). The quality of this video was poor and was usually considered unusable. This video made 
no contribution to the execution of the JFITE thread. 
• Multiple attempts were made to stream compressed/reduced frame rate motion imagery 
through the PRC-117G/Tacticomptm T5 tactical network. Generally, the imagery started 
streaming with sufficient resolution to provide a tactical operator good situational 
awareness, however, due to apparently insufficient overall throughput, data packets 
began dropping, and video clarity rapidly degraded to unusable in about 2 minutes.  This 
occurred even at a low targeted bit rate of approximately 100kbps / 5 frames per second. 
 
• VideoLAN Client (VLC) media player software was used to stream and display the pre-
recorded HART UAS video from the TOC to a dismount via the PRC-117G/Tacticomptm 
T5 tactical network.  The video was clear at first and provided tactical situational 
awareness, but after 30-45 seconds the image began to pixelated; after approximately two 
minutes, the image was thoroughly pixelated.  
  
• A more effective video compression software application is required to provide ow 
reliable motion imagery transmission over a PRC-117G mesh network. 
 
4.4 JBAIIC Architecture Findings 
 
• The JBAIIC network provided reliable connectivity between the JBAIIC nodes 
permitting the effective participation of JBAIIC nodes in the execution of the JFITE 
thread. 
 
• As currently configured, and in the absence of an effective compression algorithm, the 
JBAIIC network cannot effectively disseminate motion imagery to the JBAIIC tactical 
nodes. Therefore, imagery transmitted to tactical users should generally be limited to high 
quality still images. This is the same approach being adopted by HART, whose goal is to 
provide high quality still images to end users, rather than low quality motion imagery. 
 




 This section lists and provides assessments for the objectives and objective questions that were 
developed for JBAIIC participation in JEFX 10-3.  Each objective question is assigned a 
“stoplight” color assessment as defined below: 
Green    Objective fully satisfied 
Green Yellow  Objective primarily satisfied 
Yellow  Objective partially satisfied 
Red    Objective not satisfied. 
Blue.    No test. The conditions required for evaluating the objective did not occur 
 
 
Objective ISRS 1. JBAIIC participation in the JFITE Collaborative Targeting enterprise. 
Objective Question ISRS 1.01.  Did the TOC successfully participate in CT collaboration?  
The CT software was installed on the S3’s workstation in the TOC. In the early phases of JEFX 
10-3, there were problems with CT. In the later phases, CT seemed to be working more reliably 
but the TOC was successfully executing the JFITE thread using IPC and JFITE chat. CT offered 
no obvious advantages to the prosecution of the targets so it was not employed. The S3 did 
occasionally look in CT to see which targets had been entered into the CT Mission Tracks 
Workspace.  
Objective Question ISRS 1.02.  Did the JTAC successfully participate in CT collaboration? 
The CT software was installed on the JTAC workstation in the JRV. In the early phases of JEFX 
10-3, there were problems with CT. In the later phases, CT seemed to be working more reliably 
but the JTAC was successfully executing the JFITE thread using IPC and JFITE chat. CT offered 
no obvious advantages to the prosecution of the targets so it was not employed by the JTAC. No 
test. 
Objective question ISRS 1.03.  Did the SOF successfully participate in CT collaboration?  
The CT software was installed on the SOF SNC Tacticomptm T5 device. In the early phases of 
JEFX 10-3, there were problems with CT. In the later phases, CT seemed to be working more 
reliably but the SOF was successfully executing the JFITE thread using IPC and JFITE chat. CT 
offered no obvious advantages to the prosecution of the targets so it was not employed by the 
SOF. No test.  
 
Objective ISRS 2. Demonstrate Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) CAS operations.  
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 Objective Question ISRS 2.01. Were JBAIIC generated nine-lines and other CAS 
communications received and acknowledged by the Reaper UAS simulation?    
The JTAC generated all JBAIIC nine-lines. Normally communications between the JTAC (Baja 
06) and the Reaper (Drone 1) were via IPC. Communications were consistently received and 
acknowledged. The nine-lines were sent to the Reaper as CoT messages from the BAO Kit 
Bareback CoT application. The CoT nine-lines were displayed to the Reaper pilot in a non-
standard format which compelled him to search for the required data and sometimes resulted in 
an incorrect read back to the JTAC. 
Objective Question ISRS 2.02. Were JBAIIC generated CAS communications received and 
acknowledged by the F-15 simulation?  
The JTAC generated all JBAIIC nine-lines. Normally communications between the JTAC (Baja 
06) and the F-15 (Beagle 01) were via IPC. Communications were consistently received and 
acknowledged.  The nine-lines were read to the F-15 pilot via VoIP rather than sent via BAO Kit 
Bareback application. 
Objective Question ISRS 2.03. Were JBAIIC 9-line missions and CAS communications with 
strike aircraft sent and acknowledged over the air bridge? 
The CABLE air bridge did not provide reliable connectivity between Dugway Proving Ground 
and Nellis AFB. It was not possible to execute the JFITE thread using the air bridge. 
Objective Question ISRS 2.04. Did the tools/applications provided in the TOC furnish situational 
awareness (SA) sufficient for the conduct of strike operations?  
The CIP/CTP, VoIP, and JFITE chat provided the TOC S3 with situational awareness (SA) 
sufficient for the conduct of strike operations. 
Objective Question ISRS 2.05. Did the tools/applications provided to the JTAC furnish SA 
sufficient for the conduct of strike operations?  
The CIP/CTP, VoIP, and JFITE chat provided the JTACs with SA sufficient for the conduct of 
strike operations. In particular, the display of friendly force locations (JRV and SOF) and enemy 
targets (SA-6 and sniper) in FV facilitated the JTAC’s development of the nine-line message. 
The utility of the CIP/CTP to the JTAC would have been increased if the positions of the strike 
aircraft had been displayed. 
Objective Question ISRS 2.06. Did the tools/applications provided to the SOF furnish SA 
sufficient for the conduct of strike operations?  
The CIP/CTP, VoIP, and JFITE chat generally provided the SOF with SA sufficient for the 
conduct of strike operations. VoIP seemed slightly less reliable for the SOF than other nodes. As 
a result, there were occasions when the SOF was the only node without IPC connectivity. The 
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 other nodes proceeded with the engagement process in VoIP and consequently JFITE chat did 
not provide enough information to the SOF for a good understanding of the progress of the 
engagement. 
Objective Question ISRS 2.07. Did the tools/applications provided in the TOC permit effective 
development and execution of strike missions?   
The S3 in the TOC was assigned the task of providing an image and geo-refined coordinates of 
the sniper attacking the JTAC. The fact that HART, which was to supply the image, was not 
fully integrated into the tactical network required manual rather than automated passing of data. 
Objective Question ISRS 2.08. Did the tools/applications provided to the JTAC permit effective 
development and execution of strike missions? 
The nine-line information received by the Reaper UAS from the JTAC displayed in a non-
standard format compelled the pilot to search for the required data. This sometimes resulted in an 
incorrect read back to the JTAC. 
Objective Question ISRS 2.09. Did the tools/applications provided to the SOF permit effective 
development and execution of strike missions?  
The SOF was expected to provide geo-refined target coordinates for the SA-6 target. In principle, 
SOF did this with a preloaded image and the NITF Image Viewer. This was necessitated by the 
inability to obtain real-time HART imagery of the target and the unavailability of reference 
databases for the application of standard geo-refinement tools (e.g. PSS-SOF). 
Objective Question ISRS 2.10.  What did the air bridge link to Nellis provide you with, or enable 
you to do, things that are not possible or are more difficult in normal JTAC operations?  
The CABLE air bridge did not provide reliable connectivity between Dugway Proving Ground 
and Nellis AFB. It was not possible to execute the JFITE thread using the CABLE air bridge. 
The JMETC terrestrial link to Nellis AFB simulated an air bridge. Dugway JTACs were 
impressed with the good quality voice communications over large distances. In particular, they 
were impressed with the exchange of information with a remote (Nellis) JTAC and tasking him 
to pre-brief a strike aircraft (F-15) for the Dugway strike mission that the Dugway JTAC was to 
control. 
 
Objective JISRM 1. Create a Dugway CIP/CTP 
Objective Question JISRM 1.01. Were Dugway inputs incorporated into a CIP/CTP? 
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 The JBAIIC NOC integrated, displayed and disseminated a Dugway CIP/CTP that incorporated 
the following elements: TOC PPLI, JRV and SOF PPLI, target icons (generated by the JBAIIC 
JTAC via BAO Kit Bareback and the TOC S3 using CoT debug), target icons with images 
(generated by the TOC S3), and the array of CoT messages and icons associated with the JTAC 
dissemination of a CoT Bareback nine-line. 
 
Objective JISRM 2. Incorporate the Dugway CIP/CTP into the Nellis COP 
Objective Question JISRM 2.01. Was the Dugway CIP/CTP data successfully integrated into the 
Nellis COP? 
The Dugway CIP/CTP information was incorporated into the Nellis COP. Nellis JFITE thread 
participants displayed the locations of the JBAIIC nodes (TOC, JTAC, and SOF) and the targets 
created by the JBAIIC nodes. 
 
Objective JISRM 3. Integrate the Nellis COP into the Dugway CIP/CTP. 
Objective Question JISRM 3.01. Was the Nellis SA data successfully integrated into the Dugway 
CIP/CTP? 
The Nellis CoT data stream was successfully incorporated into the JBAIIC CIP/CTP.  Much of 
the displayed information was for tracks in the Nellis area of operations and was irrelevant to 
Dugway operations. Tracks received from Nellis that did appear in the Dugway area of 
operations included:  targets and targets with images introduced from the CAOC, targets 
introduced by the HART client in the TOC, PPLI for HART UAS assets (this appeared only on 
the last day of JEFX 10-3), and the location of the Dugway Tactical Data Network (TDN) trailer. 
The Nellis CoT stream also included a track for the simulated F-15 that never reached Dugway 
participants. 
 
Objective JISRM 4. Integrate HART into the JBAIIC tactical network. 
Objective Question 4.01 Was HART FMV successfully accessed and streamed to the tactical 
network? 
The HART video format was H.264 with augmented KLV metadata in a Flash wrapper. The 
HART program indicated it had software to convert the Flash wrapped format to a STANAG 
4609-compliant format, however they were unable to provide it for use/testing during JEFX 10-
3. Therefore, the real-time HART video could not be disseminated to the JFITE thread nodes. A 
sample of HART video in the required format was provided to the JBAIIC NOC. This 
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 unclassified imagery was transmitted in a repeating “loop” from the NOC to Nellis, pushed 
through a one way diode, and returned to Dugway on the classified network and multicast by 
PICTE from the NOC to JBAIIC participants. This recorded video had no impact on the conduct 
of the JFITE thread. 
Objective Question 4.02. Was PPLI and SPOI from HART managed UASs successfully 
integrated into the CIP/CTP? 
The original plan was to process the HART KLV data stream from the UASs with a MITRE 
application to produce PPLI and SPOI data for the UASs and introduce these data into the 
CIP/CTP.  However, HART produced a CoT data stream for the UAS assets so it was 
unnecessary to proceed as originally planned. Initially, the HART CoT messages were two 
seconds stale and timed out (did not appear in the CIP/CTP) when they reached Dugway after 
being pushed to Nellis and passed through the one way diode to the classified  network. On the 
last day of JEFX this problem was rectified and HART asset PPLI appeared in the CIP/CTP. The 
HART CoT data steam did not include asset SPOI. 
 
Objective JISRM 5. Integrate SNC devices into the JBAIIC tactical network. 
Objective Question 5.01.  Did Tacticomptm receive the CIP/CTP? 
The Tacticomptm T5 devices successfully displayed the CIP/CTP. 
Objective Question 5.02. Did Tacticomptm nodes contribute PPLI to the CIP/CTP? 
Tacticomptm T5s and T1.5s provided JRV/JTAC and SOF PPLI data to the CIP/CTP. 
Objective Question 5.03. Did Tacticomptm participate in VoIP with other nodes? 
The SOF using a Tacticomptm T5 participated in the VoIP communications supporting the 
execution of the JFITE thread. VoIP connectivity for the SOF seemed slightly less reliable than 
for other JBAIIC nodes. High winds on the exposed ridge where the SOF was located sometimes 
degraded the clarity of the VoIP. 
Objective Question JISRM 5.04. Did Tacticomptm participate in CT collaboration with other 
nodes? 
The SOF did not use the CT application. Participation in the JFITE thread was adequately 
supported by IPC and chat. No test. 
Objective Question JISRM 5.05. Did Tacticomptm successfully generate nine-lines? 
There was no requirement for the SOF to generate nine-lines in support of the JFITE thread. All 
nine-lines were generated by the JTAC. During pre-JEFX spiral testing at Camp Roberts, the 
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 Tacticomptm T5 successfully generated and disseminated Bareback CoT nine-line messages. No 
test. 
Objective Question JISRM 5.06. Did Tacticomptm participate in Openfire chat with other nodes? 
The SOF equipped with a Tacticomptm T5 device participated in the Nellis-hosted JFITE chat 
room and the Dugway-hosted CoT chat room. 
Objective Question JISRM 5.07. Did Tacticomptm receive video from the tactical network? 
The Tacticomptm T5 device received the video disseminated from the TOC (~100 kbps, 2 frames 
per second) when located on Wig Mountain. The quality of the video was mediocre to poor. The 
video was not used to support the execution of the JFITE thread. 
Objective Question JISRM 5.08. Did Tacticomptm successfully receive a CoT message with 
embedded image? 
The SOF Tacticomptm T5 received CoT messages with embedded images and was able to open 
the images from the FV display. 
 
Objective JISRM 6. Demonstrate the use of IPC between JFITE nodes. 
Objective Question JISRM 6.01. Did the TOC successfully employ IPC? 
The TOC S3 used IPC VoIP. It was the primary collaborative tool used in executing the JFITE 
thread. 
Objective Question JISRM 6.02. Did the JTAC successfully employ IPC? 
The JTAC used IPC VoIP. It was the primary collaborative tool used in executing the JFITE 
thread. Virtually all VoIP communications were via conference calls. If VoIP was used in actual 
engagements, the communication between the JTAC and strike aircraft should be point-to-point 
for critical phases of the engagement. 
Objective Question JISRM 6.03. Did the SOF successfully employ IPC? 
The SOF used IPC VoIP on the Tacticomptm T5. It was the primary collaborative tool used in 
executing the JFITE thread. VoIP connectivity for the SOF seemed slightly less reliable than for 
other JBAIIC nodes.  High winds on the exposed ridge where the SOF was located sometimes 




















AGL  Above Ground Level 
ANW2  Adaptive Networking Wideband Waveform (ANW2)  
AOI   Area of Interest 
ASOC   Air Support Operations Center  
BAO Kit Battlefield Air Operations Kit (JTAC CAS Suite) 
Bareback BAO Kit CoT-based data communication software  
BLOS   Beyond Line of Sight 
CABLE Communications Airborne Layer Expansion 
CAOC  Combined Air Operations Center 
CAS   Close Air Support 
CIP   Common Intelligence Picture 
CMOS  Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (digital image sensor technology) 
COP   Common Operational Picture 
CoT   Cursor-on-Target (XML-derivative data interoperability schema) 
CT   Collaborative Targeting 
CTP   Common Tactical Picture 
CTS  Collaborative Targeting Suite 
DPG   Dugway Proving Ground 
DPPDB  Digital Point Positioning Data Base 
FPS  Frames per Second 
FMV   Full Motion Video 
FV   FalconView 
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 GCS   Ground Control Station 
GMT   Greenwich Mean Time 
HART  Heterogeneous Airborne Reconnaissance Team  
HMD  Helmet-mounted Display 
IPC   Internet Protocol Communicator  
ISR   Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
ISRS   Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Strike 
JBAIIC  Joint Battlespace Awareness ISR Integration Capability 
JFEX   Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment 
JFITE   Joint Fighting Information to the Tactical Edge 
JFO   Joint Fires Observer 
JISRM  Joint ISR Management 
JMETC Joint Mission Environment Test Capability 
JMSM  Joint Mission Support Module 
JRV   Joint Reconfigurable Vehicle   
JTAC   Joint Terminal Attack Controller 
Kbps   kilobits per second 
KLV   Key Length Value 
LOS   Line Of Sight 
MPEG  Motion Pictures Expert Group 
NITF   National Imagery Transmission Format 
NOC   Network Operations Center 
NSA   National Security Agency 
NTTR   Nevada Test and Training Range  
PAIES  Portable Air Vehicle Information Exploitation Supercomputer 
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 PED   Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination 
PICTE   Primary Image Capture Transformation Element  
PPLI   Positive Position Locating Information  
PSS-SOF  Precision Strike Suite - Special Operations Forces 
QNT   QUINT Networking Technology 
QoS   Quality of Service 
SIGINT  Signal Intelligence 
SKL   Simple Key Loader  
SNC   Sierra Nevada Corporation  
SOF   Special Operations Force 
SPOI   Sensor Point of Interest 
STANAG  Standardization Agreement 
Tacticomptm Tactical Computer (SNC) 
Tacticnettm Tactical Network (SNC) 
Tactisighttm CMOS camera and LCD display (SNC) 
TCDL   Tactical Common Data link 
TCS   Tactical Control System 
TCP   Transmission Control Protocol 
TDN   Tactical Data Network 
TOC   Tactical Operation Center 
TST   Time Sensitive Target 
TTNT   Tactical Targeting Network Technology  
UAS   Unmanned Aircraft System 
UDP   User Datagram Protocol 
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 VAA   Vehicle Amplifier Adaptor 
VAP   Versatile Access Point (SNC) 
VoIP   Voice over Internet Protocol 



































         Beagle 01 (F‐15 OPFAC)  VOIP, Chat 





         Drone 1 (MQ‐9 GCS)  VOIP, Chat 
         Digger (ASOC)  VOIP, Chat 





         PED (Nellis)  POTS, Chat 




























                 
   1204  CESR  Drop threat emitter into IBS  IBS    























































































         #2 Joins CT event with   FalconView    








                 
   1213  PED  #1 Acknowledges request  Chat 
JFITE 
Thread 
         #2 Sends imagery to DIGGER JREAP‐C    

































BAJA 06  Confirm receipt  Chat  JFITE Ops 1 











































































         #3.  Identifies target as SA‐6  Chat  JFITE Ops 1 


















































                 


















































         #2.  Notifies TST cell  Chat 
JFITE 
Thread 























































































































                 
T‐14  1235  BEAGLE 01  Checks in with BAJA 06  VOIP    













                 
   1236  BAJA 06  Clears BEAGLE 01 to engage  VOIP    






                 
   1236  BEAGLE 01  Departs       












                 
   1237  DRONE 1  Checks in with BAJA 06  VOIP    






















                 










Person answering questionnaire: 
Operational role of person answering questionnaire: 
Person administering questions: 
Most of the questionnaire is to be answered by all participants.  In brackets after each major 
section heading it is listed who should take that section (TOC, JTAC, SOF, or All) 
Please provide as much detail and specificity as possible in the answers. 
 
1. Communications (All) 
 
1.1 Collaborative Targeting (CT) (All) 
 
• Did you use the CT application? Which chat rooms? 
• Who did you collaborate with using CT? 
• Was CT effective? 
• Comments on the use of CT? 
 
1.2 Internet Protocol Communicator (IPC) (All) 
 
• Did you use IPC? 
• Who did you communicate with using IPC? 
• What was the quality of IPC? 
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 • Comments on IPC? 
 
1.2 Openfire/Transverse chat (All) 
 
• Did you use Openfire/Transverse chat? 
• Who did you communicate with using this chat? 
• Comments on Openfire/Transverse chat? 
• Other than those addressed above, did you use any other communication means? 
 
2. CIP/CTP and SA (All) 
 
• Did you receive the CIP/CTP? 
• On what did you receive and display it? 
• Which elements of the CIP/CTP were of most value to you? Why? 
• Other than the CIP/CTP, what else contributed to your SA? 
• Was the SA with which you were provided sufficient for the conduct of strike operations? 
• Comments on SA? 
 
3. FMV (All) 
 
• Did you receive FMV? 
• From what asset(s) did you receive FMV? 
• On what did you display the FMV? 
• Was the FMV of acceptable quality? 
• How did you use the FMV? 
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 • Comments on FMV? 
 
4. Strike Operations (All) 
 
• Did the tools/applications provided permit effective development and execution of strike 
missions? 
• Comments on the strike mission (Reaper) and CAS mission (F-15) as executed? 
• Did the air link to Nellis provide you with, or enable you to do, things that are not 
possible or more difficult in normal strike operations? 
• Do you have any issues with the procedures defined by the JFITE thread? 
 
5. Aircraft Communications (JTAC) 
 
• Did you communicate with the Reaper? 
• How did you communicate with the Reaper (VoIP, CT chat, Openfire/Transverse chat)? 
• What was communicated between you and Reaper? 
• Were the available means of communications sufficient for coordination with Reaper? 
• Comments on Reaper operations? 
• Did you communicate with the F-15? 
• How did you communicate with the F-15 (VoIP, CT chat, Openfire/Transverse chat)? 
• What was communicated between you and the F-15? 
• Were the available means of communications sufficient for coordination with the F-15? 
• Comments on F-15 operations? 
 




• Did you use Tacticomptm? 
• Did you receive the CIP/CTP on the Tacticomptm device? 
• Which elements of the CIP/CTP did you find most useful? Why? 
• Did you use SNC native chat or VoIP? 
• Did you participate in CT with Tacticomptm?  
• Did you use Openfire/Transverse chat? Who did you chat with?  
• Did you use IPC VoIP? Who did you communicate with? 
• Did you receive CoT messages with embedded images? 
• Did you receive FMV? What was the source of the FMV? 
• Did you generate nine-lines with the BAO Kit on Tacticomptm? 
• Did you use NIFT Image Viewer to geo-refine target locations on Tacticomptm? 
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